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Rites Without Rights: A Tale of Two
Military Commissions
Alexandra D. Lahav
This Essay, written as part of a symposium celebrating Judith Resnik's
and Dennis Curtis's book Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy,
and Rights in City States and Democratic Courtrooms,' explores the idea
of justice being done and being seen to be done. Publicity and
performance are central to the idea of modern courts. Courts in a
democracy are supposed to perform their function publicly, openly, so
that judges may be held accountable for their actions. The adversarial
process that characterizes American courts is likewise supposed to assist
the courts in their search for truth and in their ability to do justice by
"hearing the other side." 3 But in some proceedings justice only seems to
be done. This Essay tells the stories of two military commissions and of
the federal courts' reactions to them. Through these stories, it explores
what happens when democratic institutions (in this case a democratically
elected president) want rites-that is, justice being seen to be done-
without rights. What ought a democratic society expect of courts and of
the lawyers who argue before them in such moments of crisis?
In 1942 and 2001, two presidents created military commissions to
convict the enemy. In 1942 the defendants were Nazi saboteurs; in 2001
the defendants were detainees held in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. The
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am indebted to the work of Judith
Resnik and to her suggestions for avenues of research for this piece. I would also like to thank
participants at the conference, Courts: Representing and Contesting the Public Spheres, as well as
participants in the faculty workshop at Northeastern University. Finally, I am grateful to the lawyers
representing Guantinamo Bay detainees who allowed me to interview them, the Human Rights
Institute at the University of Connecticut for a research leave, and to the University of Connecticut
School of Law and Dean Jeremy Paul for supporting my research. The excerpts from interviews
included in this paper are all anonymous, in compliance with IRB Protocol #H07-302 (University of
Connecticut).
1. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND
RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011). The title of this Essay is derived
from Chapter 13 of the book, entitled "From 'Rites' to 'Rights."' Id. at 288.
2. Id. at 301 ("[P]ublic processes of courts contribute to the functioning of democracies and give
meaning to democratic aspirations that locate sovereignty in the people, constrain government actors,
develop processes for norm elaboration, and insist on equality of treatment under law.").
3. Id. at 289-91.
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purpose of both these commissions was to jettison traditional
constitutional protections in favor of an easy governmental victory. The
government asked lawyers on both sides (defense attorneys and
prosecutors) to play the zealous advocate. It asked tribunal judges to
oversee the proceedings to achieve the desired results. It asked federal
judges to stay out of the fray or, if not, to play their part in legitimating
these proceedings. The public performances of the military commissions
and their representation in the press may be contrasted with the private
conversations and unpublicized events that limited the federal courts'
willingness to assert the importance of individual rights and to sit in
judgment of their own state.
Part I of this Essay recounts the stories of these two commissions. Both
were created by the government to harness legal procedures for political
ends.4 Yet in both cases, although the commissions were created in order
to convict the defendants, they were structured as adversarial proceedings,
permitting the defendant and his lawyer some modicum of participation in
the trial. In both cases the press was harnessed to support the
government's position that the tribunals were fair, and in both cases the
federal courts ultimately sat in judgment of the legality of the
commissions. But because it was an adversarial proceeding, the
government was not always able to script the performance completely.
Part II evaluates the promise of the federal courts and recounts the
failure of the Supreme Court to realize the ideals of institutional
independence and deliberation in each of these two military commissions.
Part III explores the constraints on the federal courts in responding to
these military commissions. The formal requirements of law constrain the
arguments that lawyers are able to make in court, and jurisprudential
commitments constrain the arguments lawyers are willing to make. If the
arguments the court hears are constrained by lawyers' craft, should judges
be judged for not doing justice? This Part then turns to what the litigation
over these military commissions achieved. Did the adjudications
described here facilitate the recognition of rights, open a dialogue about
what justice entails, or legitimate the government's actions? Does appeal
to the courts within the constitutional order ultimately legitimate the
4. OTro KIRSCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL
ENDS (1961). Kirschheimer develops the concept of courts "beyond the constitutional pale" where the
judicial apparatus is subordinated to the political command structure of society and the courts fail to
adequately balance individual interests against those of the state. Id. at 95 n. 85.
5. Kirschheimer explains how the defendant "may sometimes win a point against the
government, occasionally even fortified by the assistance of a lawyer worthy of his name. At any rate,
he has a chance to hurl his defiance against the government and measure the abyss separating him
from the official doctrine . . . ." Id. at 97; see also RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 302-03
(discussing the various uses and abuses of publicity of judicial proceedings from the perspective of
the public).
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military commissions, in that it leads society to put aside substantive
injustice because formal procedural justice has been observed? On the
other hand, to what extent have the courts incrementally transformed an
unjust process for the good? These questions have been the subject of
sociological study in other contexts and debated with respect to the civil
rights movement.6 In the context of the present military commissions,
only history will provide the definitive answer.
I. MILITARY COMMISSIONS AT MID-CENTURY AND TODAY
At the height of World War II, the Roosevelt Administration created a
military commission to try eight Nazi soldiers who had made their way
into the United States. The modem day military commissions in
Guantdnamo Bay were inspired by that precedent. Both commissions
sought to mete out quick justice outside the normal constitutional order in
makeshift tribunals with no preexisting rules. Most of the defendants in
both the 1942 and 2001 military commissions originated from a legal
regime very different from the liberal constitutional democracy of the
United States and were in that sense foreigners to our legal system, in
addition to being foreign citizens.7 In both cases participants argued about
whether the laws under which the defendants were being tried comported
with traditional legal ideals, especially the prohibition on ex post facto
laws.
There are important differences between the two commissions. The
historical context is different. World War II was a conventional war,
whereas the "War on Terror" is an unconventional war fought against
non-state actors who do not respect international law. The 1942
commissions were held on United States soil, whereas the 2001 military
commissions were held in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, which is technically
6. Some relevant sociological works include PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE
COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); JAMES C. SCoTT, DOMINATION
AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1992); and Michael W. McCann & Tracey
March, Law and Everyday Forms of Resistance: A Socio-Political Assessment, 15 STUD. IN L., POL'Y
& SoC'Y 207 (1995). On the question of the transformative capacity of Supreme Court opinions, see
MARTHA L. MINow, IN BROWN'S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA'S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK
(2010) (describing the lasting legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), outside
the courts). For a critique of the power of the federal courts to effect civil rights reforms, see
MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2007) (arguing, among other things, that the Court's decision in Brown
mobilized Southern whites).
7. Two of the Nazi saboteurs, Ernst Peter Burger and Herbert Hans Haupt, were naturalized
American citizens. David Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, I J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61, 62 (1996). Although
none of the detainees held in Guantinamo Bay have been American citizens, several American
citizens were held beyond the reach of the courts as part of the "War on Terror." See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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foreign territory, although it is fully controlled by the United States.' The
two commissions have played out quite differently so far. As the stories
below illustrate, the 1942 military commissions provided the speedy
resolution they were meant to achieve and enabled the Roosevelt
Administration to execute six of the eight Nazi saboteurs within a few
weeks of their capture. By contrast, trials by military commission in
Guantinamo Bay have moved at a glacial pace, with numerous detours to
the federal courts. The way the federal courts treated these two military
commissions is also quite different; the Supreme Court refused to exercise
jurisdiction in 1942 and embraced it in 2006. Both these differences and
the common threads that remain provide insights into the strengths and
limitations of courts.
A. Ex Parte Quirin
Around midnight on June 12, 1942, a German submarine surfaced off
the coast of Long Island.9 Four men got into a rubber boat with four boxes
of explosives, German military uniforms, and a great deal of money.'o
They headed to the beach. The men had been sent by the German
government to sabotage strategic targets in the United States. The first
person they met was a Coast Guard patrolman. They tried to bribe him
with $260." He returned to his station, turned in the money, and alerted
the authorities, but by the time the Coast Guard arrived on the scene the
saboteurs were gone. They were already on their way to New York City.
The Coast Guard recovered the explosives and uniforms that the men had
buried in the sand. Little did the American authorities know that on June
16, another group of four would land on the coast near Jacksonville,
Florida.12
Two days later, a man named George John Dasch called the FBI from
New York City to inform them that just two days earlier he had arrived by
submarine on the shore of Long Island from Germany with three other
men." Their purpose, he explained, was to sabotage strategic targets in
the United States. Soon after his call, Dasch traveled to Washington, D.C.
8. This became an issue in the litigation over the power of the federal courts to hear cases
originating in the military commissions. See Boumidiene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (holding
that detainees held in Guantinamo Bay are constitutionally entitled to the writ of habeas corpus). The
question of whether other United States constitutional protections apply in the Guantinamo military
commissions remains open, but not because of its location.
9. Danelski, supra note 7; see Louts FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY
TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW 26 (2003). The facts described in this section can be found in these
sources, unless otherwise noted.
10. FISHER, supra note 9, at 25-26.
11. Id. at 27; Danelski, supra note 7, at 63.
12. FISHER, supra note 9, at 35.
13. Id. at 32-33.
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and submitted himself to protective custody. He provided information that
enabled the FBI to apprehend all eight of the Nazi saboteurs by June 27.14
Dasch was a German who had lived in the United States, married an
American, and served in the U.S. Army." He claimed to have decided to
turn himself and his co-conspirators in as soon as he reached the United
States. A few of the other Nazi saboteurs also had American connections
and upon landing appeared to be seeking to renew those ties rather than
embark on any sabotage plan.' 6 They were not a threatening group. A
New York Times reporter, permitted to view the military commission
courtroom a few weeks later, described the saboteurs as "ordinary looking
individuals" who "were most inconspicuous physically and facially.""
From the public's perspective, the FBI successfully captured the
saboteurs quickly and before they did any damage. But hidden from the
public was the fact that the saboteurs had infiltrated the United States
without being detected by the FBI. There was no reason to believe the
FBI would have caught them had Dasch not turned in the two groups.
This was an embarrassment for the FBI and the Roosevelt
Administration.'" The Administration risked exposing this embarrassment
if Dasch was tried in civilian court. A trial would give Dasch the
opportunity to tell his whole story.
The Administration was also driven by the likely outcome if Dasch and
the others were tried in a civilian court. Because the men had not actually
committed any acts of sabotage, it was not clear that the Government
would prevail in a prosecution on that charge. In any event, the maximum
sentence was only thirty years.'" A lesser charge of conspiracy, which was
the stronger case from the government's perspective, would only result in
a three-year sentence.20 To avoid these results, the Roosevelt
Administration decided to create a military commission to try Dasch and
his erstwhile compatriots. 2' In a military commission, the government
could try the saboteurs for violations of the laws of war and could impose
the death penalty.
14. Louis FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31340, MILITARY TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN
PRECEDENT 3 (2002) [hereinafter FISHER, CRS].
15. Id at 7; Danelski, supra note 7.
16. FISHER, CRS, surpa note 14, at 28-29, 36-38. It seems that the plan was to wait at least two
months before beginning the sabotage program. Danelski, supra note 7, at 63.
17. Lewis Wood, Spy Court Session Viewed by Press: 11 Reporters Visit Shuttered, Closely
Guarded Hall Where 8 Nazi Agents are on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1942. The reporters were
invited to view the defendants and the courtroom, but not to observe the proceedings. Pictures of the
saboteurs can be found in Danelski, supra note 7, at 74-75, 77.
18. Danelski, supra note 7, at 65.
19. Id. at 66-67.
20. See FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 4.
21. See FISHER, supra note 9, at 46-49; Danelski, supra note 7, at 66-67.
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The President issued a proclamation creating military commissions to
try the German saboteurs only a week after the eight had been
apprehended.2 2 That same day the President issued a second order
appointing the members of the military commission, the prosecutors, and
the defense counsel.23 The presidential order authorized the military
commission to make its own rules, including rules of evidence. The rules
governing the commission were promulgated on July 7 and consisted of a
three and a half page, double spaced statement.24 Only eight lines of this
statement addressed the procedures that would be used in the trial. The
document specifically addressed juror challenges (there were to be no
peremptory challenges and only one challenge for cause), but all other
rules were left to the discretion of the tribunal. 25 The rules gave only this
guidance: "In general, wherever applicable to a trial by Military
Commission, procedure of the Commission shall be governed by the
Articles of War, but the Commission shall determine the application of
such Articles to any particular question. "26
The day after the rules were promulgated, the trial began. It was held in
a makeshift courtroom, a former lecture and assembly hall, room 5235 of
the Department of Justice building. The proceedings were closed to the
public.27 The glass doors at the end of the corridor were blacked over; the
windows covered in dark curtains. 28 In sum, everything about the trial was
irregular. It was a secret tribunal created out of whole cloth with the sole
purpose of convicting the defendants and sentencing them to death.
The lawyers' initial strategy was to participate. They did not attempt to
block the tribunal in the federal courts as the trial began. Yet from the
beginning, an appeal to the federal courts was in the back of their minds.
On July 6, Colonel Kenneth Royall, who had been appointed to represent
seven of the eight defendants, had written to the President expressing his
concern about the constitutionality of the military commissions and
seeking the President's permission to appeal to the federal courts. 29
According to later historical accounts, Royall thought from the beginning
that the defendants had a constitutional right to a civilian forum, but as a
military officer he hesitated to challenge the Presidential Proclamation. 30
22. Proclamation No. 2561,7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942); FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 5.
23. 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942); FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 6.
24. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 7.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. (quoting Order of July 2, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (1942)).
27. Id. The rules promulgated by the military commissions required that they be closed to the
public; select members of the press were allowed in on July 11 for a short period. Id.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Carlos M. Vdzquez, "Not a Happy Precedent": The Story of Ex Parte Quirin, in FEDERAL
444 [Vol. 24:439
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The military commission was entirely within the chain of command. For
this reason, Royall sought the President's permission to bring a suit in the
federal courts even before the trial began. Roosevelt's aide is reported to
have told him to "use his own judgment."" Royall responded by writing
the President a letter confirming his understanding that he would seek
civilian counsel to bring an appeal in the federal courts or, if that were not
possible, pursue an appeal on his own.3 2 Today, the idea of a lawyer
requiring the permission of the prosecuting entity to file a habeas petition
seems like a blatant conflict of interest. It is to Royall's credit that he
decided to go forward with the habeas proceeding. In contrast, Colonel
Carl Restine, counsel for Dasch, did not believe he was authorized to
appeal to the federal courts, although he did apparently think that civilian
counsel could do so on the defendants' behalf.33
On July 21 Royall told the tribunal that he intended to file a writ of
habeas corpus.3 4 The trial had already been going on for twelve days.
Before he filed anything with the lower courts, Royall began contacting
Justices of the Supreme Court to see if they would hear a habeas petition
over the summer when the Court was not in session." Royall and the
prosecution, including Attorney General Francis Biddle, met with Justices
Hugo Black and Owen Roberts, and talked to Chief Justice Harlan Fisk
Stone by phone over a period of days near the end of July to see whether
the Justices would be willing to hear the case in a special term. As soon as
the Justices agreed to hear the case in a special session-the Court set the
argument for July 29-Royall filed for a writ with the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia." The case was entitled Ex
Parte Quirin. On the evening of July 28, the district judge ruled that the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction and Royall appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. 37 The Supreme Court, as promised, heard oral argument
on July 29 and 30. There was no time to review the briefs, which were
submitted on July 29, so the Justices had to rely on oral argument.3 ' The
oral argument was long, lasting nine hours. Only after the oral argument
was heard did the defense counsel file a notice of appeal and perfect their
COURTS STORIES 219, 227 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
31. Id.
32. FISHER, supra note 9, at 58-59; Danelski, supra note 7, at 68.
33. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 12; Vhzquez, supra note 30.
34. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 12.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Ex Parte Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1942), aff'd per curiam, 317 U.S. 1 (1942);
FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 12.
38. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 16.
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appeal to the D.C. Circuit.39 Like the military commissions themselves,
everything about the appeal to the Supreme Court was irregular.
The Justices had various degrees of intimacy with the Roosevelt
Administration. Eight of the Justices sitting on the Court in 1942 had been
appointed by Roosevelt. Seven of them had been on the Court less than
five years and three of those had come to the bench from high positions in
the Roosevelt Administration only one year earlier.40 Justice James F.
Byrnes Jr. had been working as a de facto member of the Administration
for the previous seven months, assisting with the war effort.4 1 Justice
Felix Frankfurter played an active role in the decision to try the saboteurs
by military commission. At a dinner party on June 29, he had advised
Secretary of War Stimson to choose a military commission.4 2 Chief
Justice Stone's son served as one of the military defense attorneys for the
saboteurs.43 Both sides agreed that the Chief Justice could hear the case
because his son, Lauson Stone, was not involved in the habeas
proceedings." Justice Frank Murphy, who was a reserve army lieutenant
colonel on active duty for the summer, reluctantly disqualified himself at
Justice Frankfurter's urging.45
The pressure on the Court was enormous. The President had told the
Attorney General, Francis Biddle: "I want one thing to be clearly
understood, Francis. I won't give them up.... I won't hand them over to
any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus.
Understand!" 46 According to historical accounts, the statement was
conveyed to the Justices through Justice Roberts, and Chief Justice Stone
is said to have commented, "That would be a dreadful thing."47 Justice
Black reflected years later that Roosevelt had succeeded in "stampeding"
the Court.48
The Court moved quickly. Within a day of oral argument the Supreme
Court returned a per curiam opinion denying the writ and upholding the
jurisdiction of the military commission. 49 It was one of the fastest
39. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1 (1942) (per curiam).
40. Vizquez, supra note 30, at 229.
41. Danelski, supra note 7, at 69.
42. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 20; Danelski, supra note 7, at 69-70; Vazquez, supra note 30,
at 225.
43. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 20.
44. Id. at 20.
45. Danelski, supra note 7, at 69.
46. Vdzquez, supra note 30.
47. Id.
48. Vizquez, supra note 30, at 229 (quoting JoHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 249 (1958)).
49. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1 (1942) (per curiam); see Vdzquez, supra note 30, at 97
(discussing procedural irregularity of direct appeal from D.C. District Court); id. at 108 (discussing
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decisions ever reached by the Court, taking only eight days from the
moment they were aware of the petition to issuing the per curiam. The
saboteurs' appeal failed, but it is the way it failed that is interesting. The
petitioners were executed long before the Court announced its reasoning
for denying them review.so
It is unlikely that the Court had the time to consider fully all the
information before it. There were three thousand pages of trial transcripts
as well as seventy-page briefs. Furthermore, some of the information the
Court received was misleading. For example, at the beginning of oral
argument, Justice Jackson asked whether any of the defendants had
attempted to turn themselves in. Royall answered that they had not. This
was technically true because the defendants whom Royall represented had
not turned themselves in. But the representation was misleading to the
extent that it indicated that none of the saboteurs had turned themselves
in. After all, they were caught because one of their number, Dasch, had
turned himself in. Because Ristine had chosen not to bring an appeal, he
was not there to correct the misimpression or present Dasch's perspective
to the Court. Why Royall did not highlight Dasch's actions is unknown. It
may be because one of the reasons driving the Roosevelt Administration
to try the saboteurs by military commissions was to protect the FBI from
embarrassment. But for Dasch's actions, the FBI would not have caught
the saboteurs for some time. If the Court had had more time, this
misleading statement might have been corrected. The information about
Dasch's actions was in the record, which was largely made up of a three-
thousand-page transcript of the military commission trial."' It is unlikely
that the Court had the time to review it fully before the decision was
rendered.
The first Supreme Court opinion in Ex Parte Quirin, was a per curiam
decision dated July 31, 1942.52 It was only a page long. The opinion stated
that the Court had "fully considered the questions raised in these cases,"
but that since an opinion would "require a considerable period of time for
its preparation," the Court was issuing its decision prior to writing that
opinion.5 3 The remainder was a bare-bones ruling that the President had
the power to try the defendants before a military commission, that the
military commission was lawfully constituted, and that the defendants
were not entitled to habeas corpus because they were held in lawful
per curiam opinion).
50. The defendants were executed on August 8, 1942, but the Court's reasoned opinion was not
issued until October 29 of that year. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1.
51. Vdzquez, supra note 30, at 227 & n.26.
52. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1.
53. Id.
2012]1 447
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custody.54
The Supreme Court having issued its decision, the trial continued. On
August 3 the military panel issued its verdict, finding all eight of the
saboteurs guilty and sentencing them to death." President Roosevelt
reviewed the trial transcript the next day and ordered six of the eight to be
given the death penalty. They were executed on August 8. Dasch's
sentence was commuted to thirty years. Ernst Peter Burger, who had
arrived with Dasch that fateful night in June and turned himself in along
with Dasch, had his sentence commuted to life in prison.56
Justice Stone began drafting the Court's full opinion in August. In mid-
September he circulated a draft to the other Justices, and the process of
trying to craft a final opinion began in earnest.57 The Justices substantially
disagreed over the basis for the decision.s Yet they had to justify the
outcome because the decision had been announced and the defendants
executed. Justice Douglas later reflected that although it was "easy to
agree on the original per curiam, we almost fell apart when it came time
to write out the views." 9 For example, could the Court consider whether
the military commissions violated the laws of war given that its
procedures were kept a secret? What if the surviving defendants appealed
on the basis that the procedures were unlawful under the laws of war? The
Court might be embarrassed if it turned out that it had held the
commissions lawful prior to the execution only to learn its procedures
rendered it unlawful. The Justices also disagreed on the source and extent
of the President's power to convene military commissions. Justice
Jackson was pressured into withdrawing a concurring opinion on this
question.o Justice Frankfurter, who had encouraged the Secretary of War
Stimson to try the saboteurs by military commission, wrote a very strange
"soliloquy"-styled as a conversation between himself and an executed
saboteur-with heartfelt arguments in favor of the military
commissions.6' Ultimately, the Justices agreed on an opinion that left
many questions unanswered, holding that it was unnecessary to decide the
54. Id.
55. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 13.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id at 28.
58. For a detailed account of the nature and basis of the disagreement, see FISHER, supra note 9,
at 113-21.
59. Id at 117 (quoting WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975, at 138-39
(1981)).
60. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 31; Danelski, supra note 7, at 76-77; see also Jack Landman
Goldsmith, Justice Jackson's Unpublished Opinion in Ex Parte Quirin, 9 GREEN BAG 223 (2006)
(setting Justice Jackson's unpublished concurrence in the context of his other decisions on
presidential authority).
61. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 20.
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reach of the President's power to create military commissions or the
parameters of those commissions.6 2
Justice Frankfurter changed his opinion over the years.63 After the
extended opinion was issued in October, Frankfurter consulted an expert
on the laws of war who concluded that the procedure for creating the
military commissions was flawed.' The Justices expressed regret for the
way the Quirin case had been handled. In 1953, the Court discussed
whether to hear an expedited review of the espionage and treason case of
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson both
opposed the idea, having learned a lesson from Quirin.65 Justice
Frankfurter wrote, "We then discussed whether, as in Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, we might not announce our judgment shortly after the
argument, and file opinions later, in the fall. Jackson opposed this
suggestion also, and I added that the Quirin experience was not a happy
precedent."6 6 Justice Douglas explained his own views in an interview
twenty years later:
The experience with Ex parte Quirin indicated, I think, to all of us
that it is extremely undesirable to announce a decision on the
merits without an opinion accompanying it. Because once the
search for the grounds, the examination of the grounds that had
been advanced, is made, sometimes those grounds crumble.67
B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
The military commissions that remain active in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba
are a more familiar story. In November 2001, President George W. Bush
issued an order creating military commissions to try detainees held in the
"War on Terror." 69 Those commissions were to be held in Guantinamo
62. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942) (per curiam); FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 32-33.
63. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 39.
64. Id. at 38-39.
65. Id. at 39. For a discussion of the Court's mishandling of the Rosenberg case and the role of
the different Justices in that debacle, see Brad Snyder, Taking Great Cases: Lessons from the
Rosenberg Case, 63 VAND. L. REV. 885 (2010).
66. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 39.
67. Id.
68. Much has been written on the Guantinamo Bay military commissions. For critical analyses,
see JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2007); MICHAEL
RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD KNOW (2004); CLIVE STAFFORD
SMITH, EIGHT O'CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE: FIGHTING THE LAWLESS WORLD OF
GUANTANAMO BAY (2007); and David W. Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of
Turmoil over the Guantdnamo Military Commisions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131 (2008). For a
defense, see, for example, Frederic L. Borch II, Why Military Commissions Are the Proper Forum
and Why Terrorists Will Have "Full and Fair" Trials: A Rebuttal to Military Commissions: Trying
American Justice, ARMY L., Nov. 2003, at 10 (providing a defense of the system written by the Chief
Prosecutor).
69. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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Bay, Cuba, on a military base that is technically part of Cuba's sovereign
territory but is under the complete control of the United States. The
Guantinamo military commissions are beyond the constitutional pale in a
literal sense, in that they have been set up outside of the United States,
initially to avoid the reach of the federal courts and constitutional
constraints which protect defendants, and more recently to protect the
American citizenry.70
A conceptual separation accompanies that physical one. One of the
greatest complaints about the military commissions is that they were
initially conceived to be completely within the military chain of
command. The judge or "presiding officer" was appointed by the
prosecuting entity, the Department of Defense. The only route to an
appeal was through the President, as Commander-in-Chief, who was also
the head of the prosecuting entity.71 As Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis
explain:
The distance between the work of those in a building marked by
the words "Honor Bound to Defend Freedom" and the
requirements imposed on those obliged to provide equal justice
and hear both sides is echoed by the Guantinamo procedures,
which lack the central normative obligations that define courts. As
Bruce Ackerman has commented, the oath taken by officials at
Guantinamo tribunals did not affirm commitments specifically to
the United States Constitution. Nor were these officials asked to
repeat what federal judges must say when they take office, that
they "will administer justice without respect to persons, and do
equal right to the poor and to the rich, and will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all duties incumbent . . . under
the Constitution of the United States." The military
decisionmakers sat inside the chain of command, in no way
independent from the Appointing Authority, the Secretary of
Defense. Guantinamo's processes harked back to Renaissance
Europe, where judges' charters depended on the ruling
71powers....
The first in the long series of habeas corpus appeals to the federal courts
on behalf of Guantinamo detainees was Rasul v. Bush. In that case, the
Court was asked to decide whether the federal courts had habeas
jurisdiction over non-citizen detainees held in Guantinamo. The lawsuit
70. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 327-28. A recent attempt to hold a civilian trial for
detainees in New York City was met with fierce opposition. See Charlie Savage, In Reversal, Military
Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at Al.
71. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 332. They share this quality with the military commission
that tried the Nazi Saboteurs.
72. Id. at 332-33.
73. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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was filed by civilian counsel on behalf of detainees.74 The government
had assigned JAG lawyers to defend the detainees in future military
commission proceedings, but at that time had not yet assigned these
defense lawyers actual clients. Neil Katyal, then a law professor at the
Georgetown University Law Center, proposed to these lawyers-who
were still waiting to be assigned clients-that they file a lawsuit on their
own behalf. He suggested that they argue that they "shouldn't be made to
participate in an unconstitutional proceeding, that doing so contradicts
[their] oath to uphold the Constitution."" The lawyers refused, explaining
that without clients they could not file any suits. As one of them
explained, "My entire professional career I've worked with the
understanding that a defense counsel has no stake in any case unless he
represents a client with an interest, and I can't see a way around that
now." 76 In the end, the military defense lawyers, with Katyal's help,
decided to file an amicus brief arguing that nobody was speaking for their
future clients, who were the only detainees that both parties in the Rasul
litigation agreed were not entitled to immediate access to habeas corpus. 77
That amicus brief marked the beginning of a long fight in the federal
courts that culminated in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.78
The second person slated to be tried by military commission was Salim
Hamdan, infamous in the United States for being Osama bin Laden's
driver." One of the lawyers who had filed the amicus in Rasul, Lieutenant
Commander Swift, was assigned Salim Hamdan as his client. Katyal
remained involved in a habeas appeal on Hamdan's behalf.
Hamdan was scheduled to be tried by military commission in 2004. The
trial proceeded even as Hamdan's habeas appeal was pending. During
voir dire before the military commission, Hamdan was excluded from the
proceedings, although he had not been disruptive.so The military
74. One of these was a not-for-profit organization, the Center for Constitutional Rights. The other
was a prominent law firm that represented several Kuwaiti families who believed their relatives were
being held in GuantAnamo.
75. JONATHAN MAHLER, THE CHALLENGE: HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD AND THE FIGHT OVER
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 67 (2008) (quoting E-mail from Neal Katyal, Professor, Georgetown Law
School to Lt. Cmdr. Charles Swift and Lt. Cmdr. Philip Sundel, Department of Defense (around Mar.
2003)).
76. Id. at 69 (quoting E-mail from Philip Sundel, Lt. Cmdr., Department of Defense, to Neal
Katyal, Professor, Georgetown Law School (Nov. 10, 2003)).
77. Id. at 69-70. See Brief of the Military Attorneys Assigned to the Defense in the Office of
Military Commissions as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004) (No. 03-343), 2004 WL 96765.
78. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
79. The first person slated for trial was an Australian named David Hicks, who ultimately pled
guilty and received nine months in prison and a seven-year suspended sentence. See Alexandra Lahav,
Portraits of Resistance: Lawyer Responses to Unjust Tribunals, 57 UCLA L. REV. 725, 736-741
(2010) (describing the trial of David Hicks).
80. See MAHLER, supra note 75, at 133-37.
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commission rules gave the presiding officer discretion in this, as in all
other matters. In fact, the presiding officer could allow hearsay, coerced
evidence, and, in the first iteration of the military commissions, evidence
obtained through cruel and inhumane treatment or even torture.' Again
and again, as they made their way up the federal court hierarchy, the
lawyers successfully used the presiding officer's decision to exclude
Hamdan to prove that the commissions were unfair. 82 The fact of his
exclusion seemed more offensive to fundamental ideas of due process
than the existence of an abstract discretionary rule permitting such
exclusion. Because the lawyers participated in that first tribunal, they
were armed with a concrete and powerful example of the military
commission's overreaching.
First-person accounts can illuminate injustice better than abstract
descriptions. One lawyer who participated in the military commissions
described the courtroom in Guantinamo where Hamdan's trial took place:
Although there was no judge in these proceedings, the presiding
officer was ordered to wear a robe (and ours carried a gavel);
although this was a commission and not a court, the commission
room, formerly a dental clinic, was swathed in blue velvet curtains
and rich, dark wood furniture so as to look like a courtroom. The
curtains only went two thirds of the way up the painted cinder
block wall-just high enough to fill the frame of the closed circuit
video cameras. For those of us appearing as defense lawyers in the
commissions, we knew we were on a hastily constructed set,
where costume and props and scenic design attempted to
consecrate the once-barren space. In our very first commission
session, we were handed a document listing speaking parts for the
presiding officer, the lawyers, and our client, and ordered, with no
apparent sense of irony, to follow "the script. "83
Hamdan's appeal reached the Supreme Court in 2005. Writing about
the experience, Katyal explained his strategy. He specifically focused on
the argument that the military commissions were an unconstitutional
exercise of executive power in the absence of congressional authorization.
Katyal explained that although some advocacy groups wanted him to
argue that the military commissions were unconstitutional, a broader
strategy would have been quite premature. One day the Court may need to
reach them, but for purposes of Hamdan, it was appropriate to say that the
Court could strike down the commissions and invite corrective action, if
81. Glazier, supra note 68, at 185-94.
82. Id. at 159 (describing the oral argument before Judge Robertson in October 2005).
83. Munir Ahmad, Resisting Guantdnamo: Rights on the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1683, 1763 (2009).
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necessary."84
Ultimately, Hamdan prevailed under Katyal's theory. The Court ruled
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the military commissions, as presently
constituted, violated separation of powers principles.15 That was not the
end of the story. Congress speedily ratified the military commissions with
some minor changes. 6 The lawyers' success was short lived. While there
is an argument that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ameliorated the
worst injustices, there remained substantial criticisms of the military
commission process that called its fairness into question.87 But this was
not the end of Hamdan's battle in the federal courts.
In July 2008, days before he was set to be tried by military commission,
Salim Hamdan appealed to the D.C. District Court to stay his trial and
rule that the trial procedures violated due process." The court declined to
hear the case, pointing to Hamdan's right to appeal after the military
commission trial had been completed. The judge recognized that judges
might differ on the requirements of procedural justice and left the
determination up to the appellate process.89 He took pains to recognize the
legitimacy of the military commission, explaining that "Article III judges
do not have a monopoly on justice."90 The judge then wrote about the
importance of the appearance of fairness: "The eyes of the world are on
Guantinamo Bay. Justice must be done there, and must be seen to be done
there, fairly and impartially." 91
Sixty-six years after the trial of the Nazi saboteurs, Salim Hamdan was
finally scheduled to go to trial before the new military commissions. He
had been in Guantinamo for five years. At Hamdan's trial, the presiding
officer held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the commission
proceedings, but he did exclude some evidence he found was obtained by
coercion.92 Hamdan was found guilty of providing material support to a
terrorist organization and sentenced to five and a half years, but because
84. Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes To Practice, 120 HARV.
L. REv. 65, 95 (2006).
85. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
86. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-50 (2008). See generally Glazier, supra
note 68 (analyzing the Military Commissions Act).
87. Neither does the more recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), address
these questions. That decision permitted habeas petitions to proceed in the lower federal courts. See
Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Teror and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 628-29
(2010) (analyzing Boumediene and describing scholarly reactions to the decision).
88. See Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2008).
89. See id. at 137.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 137.
92. Ruling on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices, United
States v. Hamdan, CMCR 09-002 (July 20, 2008); Ruling on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on
Fifth Amendment, United States v. Hamdan, CMCR 09-002.
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he had already served five years in Guantinamo, his sentence amounted
to four months.93
II. THE IDEALS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND REASONED
DELIBERATION
When Judge Robertson said that "Article III judges do not have a
monopoly on justice," his statement was correct. There are ordinarily
different ways to achieve justice outside the federal courts-through
litigation in state courts, political action and protest, and legislative action.
But in the context of the military commissions, the statement takes on a
different dimension. The lawyers did have special expectations of Article
III judges. Their argument was that Article III courts have a monopoly on
justice because they can assert that constitutional protections apply in
Guantinamo over the objections of the other branches of government. Do
the courts correspondingly have a special obligation to define procedural
justice for the military commissions?
In concert with the judges' role, the lawyers' central role is to make
legal arguments to the tribunal on behalf of their client.94 The premise of
the lawyer's role in an adversarial system is the idea that justice is
achieved by equal and opposite arguments being tested against one
another before a neutral arbiter-the judge-who issues a ruling that
presumably correctly applies the law to the facts at hand. This assumption
is, in turn, based on the belief that reasoned argument can alter outcomes.
That is not to say that this belief is not questioned. Nevertheless, the
power of reasoned deliberation to achieve rectitude remains a foundation
of lawyer self-understanding and of the adversarial system.
The belief that the judge will reach the correct result-with the
assistance of the lawyer's presentation of the arguments-rests on two
principles: judicial independence and reasoned deliberation. When these
two principles break down, as they did in various ways in Ex Parte Quirin
and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, this creates a crisis for the lawyers' professional
role, as well as for the judges. As Otto Kirchheimer explained:
[C]ourts are prone to put the disciplinary problem and the
"lawyers as an officer of the court" theorem in the foreground,
overlooking a special feature, absent in this form from other trials:
93. See Robert F. Worth, Bin Laden Driver To Be Sent to Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.con2008/l 1/26/washington/26gitmo.html.
94. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 4, at 254-55 (discussing the relationship of the lawyer and client in
political trials and the role of the courts in disciplining lawyers, especially lawyers representing
"marginal political elements"); JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS
8-9 (1964) (defining legalism as an ethical attitude that morality consists of rule following, and noting
that legalism is "the operative outlook of the legal profession").
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their own emotional and political involvement, the fact that the
credibility of the trial, their own credibility, and that of the state
organization they serve are for better or worse inseparably
linked."
The choices judges and lawyers made in these moments of crisis reveals
the limits of the courts in a democracy.
A. Judicial Independence
One basis for the legitimacy of the federal courts in the American
system of government stems from separation of powers principles. The
federal courts are understood as separate and independent from both the
executive and the legislature. Curtis and Resnik point out that lack of
judicial independence was a key complaint of the colonists against
George III and establishing an independent judiciary was a central
component of both the state and federal constitutions they drafted.
Alexander Hamilton wrote that the power of the judicial branch is
largely a function of public trust, having "no influence over either the
sword or the purse."97 Justice Frankfurter similarly opined in his dissent in
Baker v. Carr that "[t]he Court's authority-possessed of neither the
purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in
its moral sanction."98 One of the problems with the perception of court
independence as its source of authority is that the courts are not in fact
separate from the other political branches.99 Courts are more
interdependent than independent, relying on the executive "not only to
enforce court orders but also for their budgets, staff, facilities, and often,
their jurisdiction to hear certain categories of cases."' 00 Courts do not
choose their own membership; federal judges are appointed by the
executive with the advice and consent of Congress.'0o Finally, the
minority or the dissenter who comes before the federal courts seeking
redress faces another problem. To the extent that the courts' legitimacy
rests on public perception and the public is hostile to the marginalized
individual or group, they may be concerned that the courts are not, in fact,
independent and outside the political fray, but instead deeply imbedded in
it.
95. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 4, at 255-56.
96. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 292.
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton).
98. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
99. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L. REv. 993, 999-
1000 (2011) (citing sources for the proposition that checks and balances, rather than separation of
powers, is the better metaphor).
100. RESNIK& CURTIS, supra note 1, at 292.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Reasonable people differ on what will sustain public confidence in the
courts. For example, Justice Frankfurter wanted the federal courts to stay
out of the political fray and to police the lines between judicial and so-
called political questions vigorously. 10 2 These lines are very difficult to
draw, but they are also central to a liberal democracy.o 3 Furthermore, the
decision not to act is also a form of action. Some members of the public
will inevitably criticize the judiciary's refusal to intervene, and for others
staying out of the fray will diminish the judiciary's standing.
The Quirin case illustrates some of the problems that can arise as a
result of the unavoidable interrelationship between the branches in the
extreme case. Having no power itself, the judicial branch is dependent not
only on public will but also on the other branches respecting its rulings
and following its injunctions. This mutual respect is the foundation on
which the courts act. When the President threatens to ignore court
injunctions, as Roosevelt did in Quirin, or when Supreme Court Justices
advise the executive on actions that later come before the Court, as Justice
Frankfurter did, that interrelationship strains the Court's ability to make
independent judgments.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, by contrast, the Court stood up to the executive
branch, holding that the President lacked the power to create military
commissions absent Congressional action. Yet the Court avoided making
determinations regarding the minimum procedural protections that ought
to be available to detainees being tried by military commission,
essentially giving Congress a free hand to shape the commissions to its
liking. Judith Shklar's explanation is as apt today as it was fifty years ago:
When the Court leaves Congress free to act, it in effect gives its
stamp of approval to those actions .... In acquiescing to Congress
one may preserve the fiction of a nonpolitical Court by making its
decisions uncontroversial. It is a political calculation that any
judge faced with a political trial must make.104
Deferring to the legislative branch allowed the Court to assert its power
and police the line between law and politics without a direct
confrontation. By deferring to Congress, the Court gave the impression of
deference to the political branches even as it limited executive power. Yet
in so doing, the Court did not assert the power of law over expedience and
refused to define the elements of procedural justice required for a trial to
be fair. The Court left open to the Government the ability, whether
102. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 265-66 (2002) (discussing
Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr).
103. See SHKLAR, supra note 94, at 217.
104. Id. at 217.
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through the legislative or executive branches, to try outsiders without
traditional procedural protections. In Quirin, the decision was more
limited in some ways but more protective in others-there the Court did
not distinguish between citizens and foreigners. 05 The limited approach
of the Hamdan Court was encouraged by the lawyers, who adopted a
theory that the Court should be asked to rule on narrower separation of
powers grounds rather than delve into what constitutional protections, if
any, apply in Guantinamo.10 6
B. Reasoned Deliberation
The second basis for court legitimacy is that courts operate within
preexisting legal structures and issue reasoned opinions based on the
application of the law to the facts of the case. By applying regular
procedures that are determined in advance, the courts are supposed to
administer the law impartially and fairly and law remains relatively
autonomous. Reasoned deliberation and independence are interrelated.
The courts are able to engage in reasoned deliberation because they are
independent; professional mores allow them to maintain that
independence. Reasoned opinions, the public embodiment of judicial
deliberation, allow the public to check that the courts are in fact engaged
in the process of legal reasoning. For some, the underlying faith is that
through the process of reasoned deliberation made public, the courts will
reach just decisions.
The story of Ex parte Quirin illustrates a failure of this theory to be
realized in practice in two ways. First, the judges did not engage in
reasoned deliberation because they did not have time. To the extent that
the petitioner's lawyers were trying to appeal to the logic of the law to
save their clients, the futility of the endeavor is evidenced by the fact that
the court was unable to work out the legal reasoning prior to its decision.
There was no opportunity for justice to work its way into the discussion
through reasoned deliberation. The failure of principle in Quirin is not
only in the substance of the decision, which has been largely rejected, but
also in the failure of the fundamental requirement that a court provide
reasons for its decision. An opinion issued after the result is a fait
accompli cannot rid itself of the impression (and the reality) of
105. See Resnik, supra note 87, at 593.
106. This point is elaborated in the discussion of Katyal's strategy. See Katyal, supra note 84;
infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
107. The process of reasoning to reach just outcomes is the bulwark of Lon Fuller's theory that
law will not work its way towards iniquity: "When men are compelled to explain and justify their
decisions, the effect will generally be to pull those decisions toward goodness, by whatever standards
of ultimate goodness there are." Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Low-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958).
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rationalization rather than reason. This hard truth plagued the Justices,
who as we have seen expressed regret over the procedures in that case.
The Justices put themselves in the unpleasant position of trying to justify
their decision after the fact. Was this a failure of process and timing in
that particular case or an assault on the methodology of reasoning itself?
Second, even if the Justices had had time, it is unclear that the process
of reasoned deliberation would have resulted in a just outcome. The story
of Quirin leaves open the question of what would have happened had the
Justices engaged in a process of reasoned deliberation instead of a rush to
judgment. On the one hand, after looking more careflully at the laws of
war and reading through the trial transcript, the Justices might have
reached a different result. For example, the Justices might have picked up
on the fact that Dasch had turned himself in to the authorities and
intended to do so from the beginning. On the other hand, the political
pressures of the moment would have remained intense into the fall of
1942 and beyond, even if the Court had taken its time. First, the
President's threat that he would disregard any writ issued by the Court put
that institution in a shaky position. Second, the Justices were intimately
involved with the Administration. Justice Frankfurter had, after all,
advised members of the Administration to pursue a military commission
strategy. Third, the alternatives-particularly trial in a civilian court-
were unpalatable, not least because the maximum sentence was quite
short. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the country remained at war
for several more years.
Sixty years later, when deciding Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,0 8 the Justices of
the Supreme Court had a substantial amount of time to consider the
legality of the military commissions in Guantinamo. Hamdan's case
made its way through the federal system at a pace that gave the Justices
years to contemplate the issues raised by trying detainees in the "War on
Terror" by military commission in Guantdnamo. Yet the Justices could
not agree on substantive issues in the case when it came time for them to
decide it. For example, the Justices could not agree on whether the
offenses with which Hamdan was charged were triable by military
commission at all.o' Only a plurality was prepared to hold that basic
rights "recognized as indispensible by civilized peoples" included the
right to be present at his trial and be privy to the evidence against him.'
Justice Kennedy declined to rule on the question of what minimal
108. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
109. A plurality of Justices (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) signed on to Part V
of the opinion of the Court, concluding that military commissions could only try offenses against the
laws of war. Id. at 595-613 (2006).
110. That plurality included Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 633-35.
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procedures ought to be available under the Geneva Convention. He wrote
that the procedures used against Hamdan deviated from those available in
court martial without demonstrating "evident practical need," leaving
open the argument that pressing governmental needs could allow the
government to dispense with the traditional procedural protections that
many consider fundamental to a fair trial."'
The Supreme Court's response in both 1942 and 2006 was wanting. In
both cases the result was that the military commissions remained outside
of the constitutional order because of failures in deliberation and
independence, although the failures were very different in each case. In
1942 the Court failed in its obligation to deliberate at all until it was too
late. In 2006 the Court failed in its obligation to produce the product of
deliberation, that is, to assert a normative vision of the requirements for a
fair trial. If the courts are to participate in a normative dialogue with the
other branches of government, more work needs to be done to develop a
normative vision that will constitute that dialogue.1 12
Despite these limitations and the Court's refusal to stand as a bulwark
in defense of individual rights, in both cases court involvement resulted in
greater publicity for the military commissions. In the Hamdan case in
particular, the adjudication spurred the development of a lawyer
movement against the military commissions that is discussed at greater
length below. In that case, the Court's opinion was at least as important in
spurring lawyer mobilization as the legal propositions for which it stands.
III. BETWEEN THE KING AND THE ANGEL GABRIEL: THE CONSTRAINTS
ON COURTS AND THE LIMITS OF ADJUDICATION
The narratives of both military commissions are reminiscent of a story
from the Talmud, recounted by Robert Cover. 13 The Talmud explains the
prohibition on judging the King in the following way. A slave of the King
had killed a man and the head of the Sanhedrin (judges), Simeon b.
Shetah, advocated that the King ought to be called before them to be
judged. The judges sent for the King, who sent the slave to them. But this
did not satisfy them, and they sent again for the King to appear in person.
Simeon called for the King to stand before the court so that the witnesses
could testify against him. "The King replied 'I will not act by your word
111. Id. at 646.
112. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 304 ("[A]djudication does not always yield wise or just
results. Our argument is that it offers opportunities for democratic norms to be implemented through
the millions of exchanges in courts among judges, the audience, and the litigants."); Resnik, supra
note 87, at 670 (noting that public courts achieve "acknowledgement of the existence of conflicts" and
"opportunities to develop or revisit governing precepts").
113. Robert M. Cover, Folklales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179, 184
(1984).
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but by the words of the court as a whole.' He turned to the left and to the
right, but all looked to the ground." 1l4 The judges feared calling the King
to account because of the obvious worldly consequences. Simeon then
said to the judges, "Let the Master of Thoughts call you to account."' 15
The Angel Gabriel then smote all the judges, except Simeon, and the rule
was established that the King would not be judged.
When a court faces down the President, under threat that he will not
obey its orders or that the public will lose faith in the court based on its
decisions, the court finds itself between the proverbial King and the Angel
Gabriel. Either the decision to hold the executive branch to account or the
refusal to do so may result in a fatal blow to the legitimacy of the court.
Since the court lacks the means of enforcing its orders, such a loss of
legitimacy is grave indeed. In both Quirin and Hamdan, the Supreme
Court produced a performance of adjudication that did not, in fact, engage
with the deeper issues of injustice raised by those cases. In Quirin, the
Court chose the King. The court's performance in Hamdan was arguably
designed to walk a safe path between the King and the Angel Gabriel. Are
these types of performances inherent in the nature of courts and the
process of adjudication in times of crisis?
When lawyers appealed to the federal courts so that their clients might
not be tried by military commission they must have believed, at some
level, that the process of reasoned deliberation would lead the court to a
just outcome even with respect to a regime beyond the constitutional pale.
The lawyers' goal may have been transformative court-ordered changes,
but even in Hamdan, widely understood as a victory for detainees, the
changes revealed themselves to be incremental."' At least in part, the
result was constrained by the way courts operate and the role of lawyers
within courts.
The decision to seek justice from the courts requires that advocates
argue on the court's terms and narrow the issues that the court will decide.
This is part of the performance of adjudication. By contrast, the political
process allows more open ended arguments. Narrow arguments may be
institutionally driven. Narrowing may also be self-imposed, a product of
the lawyer's jurisprudential philosophy or his sense of the requirements of
advocacy. This narrowing process pushes in an incrementalist or even
conservative direction and discourages transformational change.
114. Id. at 187 (quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin, 19a-19b).
115. Id.
116. Many think that this is also the story of the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The federal courts became the forum of choice for the cause of
desegregation when Southern state courts offered little possibility of a fair outcome. Although Brown
was a transformative decision in many ways, it has also been demonstrated to have been one part of a
much larger political strategy. See supra note 6 (citing sources on the significance of Brown).
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A. The Constraints ofLegal Argument: Real and Perceived
Lawyering entails a particular craft because the process of adjudication
is a performance with its own set of rules. These rules constrain the
advocate. Sometimes formal legal constraints limit the availability of
particular avenues of argument.' 17 Constraints can also be practical,
formed (at least in part) by the lawyer's perception of what will "work."
These constraints of craft raise important questions. What is the
relationship between the power granted to the courts in a democratic
system and the process constraints on courts? Is this power legitimate
because of these constraints or despite them? If the constraints come from
lawyers' craft, does it matter for judging judges that the lawyers did not
ask the court to "do justice"?
Lawyers may feel more justified internalizing constraints that they
understand to be imposed by legal requirements or the institutional
structure of the court. Self-imposed constraints, by contrast, put the
lawyer in a potential conflict with his client, because he must pit his own
sense of what is appropriate to argue before a court against what may be
in the best interest of his client or what the client may wish to do."' The
first cases filed on behalf of Guantinamo detainees illustrate how lawyers
understand the constraints of appeals. These appeals were filed before the
military commissions were convened. They were requests to find out
whether and why a client was held on the military base in Guantdnamo
Bay, Cuba, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.119
In 2002, the names of persons detained at Guantdnamo were not made
public. A Kuwaiti family hired a prominent law firm to assist them in
determining where their son was being held. After making some inquiries
with the State Department and other agencies and being rebuffed, the
lawyers decided to go to the federal courts.12 0 The period was an intense
one in American politics and society. The tragedy of 9/11 loomed large.
Anthrax scares rocked the capital. The lawyers were worried about the
public perception of seeking to free terrorists. So they sought to work on
behalf of their clients in light of these political constraints. They
117. For example, the collateral bar rule forbids a litigant to dispute the validity of an injunction
in a contempt proceeding for violating that injunction. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 88 U.S.
307 (1967).
118. This has been the theme of much of the scholarship on "cause lawyering." See generally
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat
ed., 1998) (describing concept of cause lawyering and including essays on cause lawyering in a
variety of contexts); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN:
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004) (same).
119. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, Al Odah v. United States, 103
F. Appx. 676 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
120. David Luban, Legal Ethics in Guantcinamo, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1981, 1989 (2008).
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developed a strategy of keeping the complaint "very narrow."l 2 1 As one
participating lawyer recalled, "So I said 'let's play it cute-we won't file
habeas corpus . . . we'll invoke federal question jurisdiction, we'll file
under the [Administrative Procedure Act] and we'll say we had reason to
believe these nine or ten .. . people are in the custody of the United
States."' 1 22 The claims were based on Department of Defense regulations
and what the lawyers asked for was very limited, as this lawyer
characterized the strategy: "[N]umber one, do you have these guys?
Number two, if you do have they been charged with anything and if so,
what charges? And number three, we want to contact them. That's it.
Nothing about release, nothing about habeas corpus, that's it." 2 3
At the beginning, given the political atmosphere in 2002, the lawyer
explained, "we made plain in our opening complaint . .. that we were not
alleging innocence. All we were seeking were the three little things I said:
are you holding them? Have they been charged? And we want contact.
Later, as it developed, we expanded that somewhat to ask for due
process."l 2 4 Despite these narrow arguments, the lawyer believed that the
clients were in fact innocent. 125 The lawyer and his colleagues had to
convince the prestigious firm for which they worked that it was
acceptable to represent detainees alleged to be terrorists. The lawyer
explained:
[T]he pitch to the firm . . . was we're not representing defendants
who are terrorists-we're not in this for representing terrorists.
We're seeking minimum due process of fairness, that's it, that's as
far as we'll go. And should the day come that they will be charged
by military commissions, we will be out.'
The lawyers who brought the first set of detainee cases took a narrow
approach to appeal both to the public and the courts. So did Hamdan's
lawyers a few years later.
Law and politics are linked in the lawyers' decisions about how to
litigate a case. Judges were well aware of the nearness of 9/11, the threat
of anthrax in Washington, D.C., the atrocities at Abu Ghraib, and myriad
other political events. For these reasons some Justices wanted to defer to
121. Interview with Lawyer No. 4 (June 24, 2008), at 3.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 7.
125. He explained, "I don't think I would have taken on the case, myself, if I thought they were
indeed guilty." Id. at 8.
126. Id. at 8. The lawyer noted, "Everyone assumed that anyone who was in Guantinamo was a
terrorist ... . Plus, many members of the firm in New York had relatives or friends who died in the
Twin Towers. And so there was personal anguish, there was political-social anguish, and there was
economic anguish to the extent that any public link between the firm and terrorists might cause loss of
clients." Id. at 7.
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the executive. These Justices were satisfied to leave the litigation beyond
the constitutional pale. In the 1960s, political philosopher Otto
Kirchheimer described a court subordinated to the governmental
command structure with a minimal role in balancing the interests of the
state against individual interests.127 Kirchheimer might have been
describing Justice Thomas's and Justice Scalia's dissents in Hamdan.
Justice Thomas wrote, "The plurality's evident belief that it is qualified to
pass judgment on the 'military necessity' of the Commander in Chief's
decision to employ a particular form of force against our enemies is so
antithetical to our constitutional structure that it simply cannot go
unanswered."l 2 8 Justice Scalia similarly argued that "military necessities
relating to the disabling, deterrence, and punishment of the mass-
murdering terrorists of September 11 require" that the Court abstain from
the case.12 9
The decision to adopt a narrow litigation strategy was critical to the
unfolding of the Hamdan litigation. In his reflections on the experience,
the architect of the lawyers' strategy, Neil Katyal, explained that he was
deeply influenced by Alexander Bickel's idea of the "passive virtues" of
the Court. That is, the manner in which "the Court employed procedural
and jurisdictional doctrines to produce a useful 'time lag between
legislation and adjudication, as well as shifting the line of vision."'130 In
reconstructing his appellate strategy, Katyal appeared to use Bickel's
theory as only a description of what the Supreme Court does, rather than a
normative theory of what the Court ought to do. For example, Katyal
explained:
[W]e sought to use the facts and the law to diminish the
motivating principles that might otherwise have led the Court to
adopt Professor Bickel's passive virtues. Whereas Bickel feared a
Court that would rule on an issue of first impression, we sought to
educate the Court about the issue repeatedly to ensure that it was
not an issue of first impression. Whereas Bickel feared a Court
that would rule on a matter without a developed factual record, we
sought to develop that factual record in a few key moves that did
not compromise Mr. Hamdan's interests in a subsequent trial. And
whereas Bickel feared a Court that would lose its legitimacy by
undermining the political branches, we sought to show that the
Court's action would only invalidate a trial system that had never
127. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 4, at 95.
128. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 678 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. Id at 674 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Katyal, supra note 84, at 84 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 112, 116 (2d ed. 1986)).
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actually been used.'3 1
At first blush this description of the legal team's strategy looks like it is
merely a response to the realities of how courts proceed. In fact this
description acceptsa normative theory about what the Supreme Court can
be expected to do. By assuming that the passive virtues describe the
Court's approach, the lawyers' strategy impliedly signed on to them.
Katyal's approach extended beyond the strategy involved in timing and
fact development. It extended to the legal team's substantive decision to
argue that the military commissions were unconstitutional on separation
of powers grounds.
The more lawyers accept the description of what courts do in the most
controversial cases as deciding on the narrowest possible grounds, the
greater the risk that lawyers will avoid arguments that question the
"passive virtues." But it is not clear that the passive virtues are
normatively desirable-at a minimum this is a substantial point of
contention.132 For Bickel the passive virtues were indeed virtuous, and
Katyal seemed to adopt this view as well. The truth is it was a successful
strategy. Nevertheless, this strategy allowed the Court to leave open
critical questions such as whether fundamental rights and particular
constitutional protections apply in the Guantinamo Bay military
commissions. The passive virtues would dictate that the Court should
avoid making such decisions or delay them until the political branches can
find their feet. But this approach has a cost to individuals and to the
lawyers representing them.
The point here is not that the approach that Hamdan's legal team
adopted was misguided, but rather that it reflected a legal philosophy, as
all representation reflects the legal philosophy of the advocate to some
degree. By choosing a philosophy of adjudication, the lawyer limits
himself and his client and excludes other normative visions. While the
Court is theoretically able to follow those other excluded lines of
reasoning sua sponte, it is a hallmark of the system that courts decide the
issues that the litigants present.13 3 Constraints of craft and performance
that legitimate court proceedings also limit them. Expectations that the
judge "hear the other side" are based on an understanding of
adversarialism embedded in the system-it is the performance of both
131. Id. at 94.
132. See Steven Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, Ill COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122,
125 (2011) (arguing that "[allthough the Justices have repeatedly acted to assert and preserve the
institutional role of the federal courts more generally, they have been decidedly unwilling to engage
the substance of counterterrorism policies, especially in cases in which those policies relate to alleged
abuses of individual civil liberties").
133. See generally Amanda Frost, The Limits ofAdvocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447 (2009) (discussing
the power of courts to consider issues without litigants raising them).
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sides that allows the judge to hear the other side. 134 How harshly should
we judge the judges in not embracing a rights-protective approach in
Hamdan when the lawyers did not demand it of them? Or is the obligation
of life tenure that judges not avert their eyes; are they obligated to "take
advantage of [life tenure] to seriously discomfit the wielders of
power?"135 In not doing more, are judges and lawyers part of an
"apparatus ofcomplicity"?136
The lawyers in Ex parte Quirin experienced a different set of
limitations. Whereas Katyal assumed he would bring the Hamdan case to
the federal courts from the start, the defense lawyers in the Nazi saboteurs
case struggled with the question of whether they could go to the federal
courts at all. Royall's decision to seek habeas review took some courage,
as it required a military officer to seek from the Court specifically what
the Commander-in-Chief wanted to avoid: a public, civil trial. Moreover,
the Administration's position that military commissions provided
sufficient procedural protections had public support. Many news outlets
saw the 1942 military commissions as a paragon of fairness. Opening up
the courtroom to journalists was likely intended to achieve this effect.
After the trial, the New York Times editorialized: "We had to try them
because a fair trial for any person accused of crime, however apparent his
guilt, is one of the things we defend in this war."' Similarly, The New
Republic lectured: "It is good to know that even in wartime and even
toward the enemy we do not abandon our basic protection of individual
rights."' Royall was criticized for his efforts by some who perceived his
representation of the saboteurs as disloyal. 3"
Neither the military commissions convened in 1942 nor those convened
after 2001 were entirely secret, as this would not have achieved the
governmental objective. Instead the government allowed for carefully
crafted public moments, where journalists were allowed in to witness a
scripted spectacle. Resnik and Curtis point out that the problem with
government sponsored spectacle, from the government's point of view, is
that "those who produce spectacles do not control their meaning or
effects." 4 0 One of the lawyers representing Guantdnamo detainees before
the military commissions explained about the government's approach:
134. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 291.
135. Cover, supra note 113, at 200.
136. Id. at 200, n. 73; see also Lahav, supra note 79, at 730 (discussing lawyer complicity in
military commissions).
137. FISHER, CRS, supra note 14, at 35 (quoting They That Take the Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1942, at 8).
138. Id at 35 (quoting The Saboteurs and the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 10, 1942, at 159).
139. Vizquez, supra note 30, at 228.
140. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 295 (attributing this insight to Michel Foucault).
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Once the media sort of embraced us as heroes, guardians of
law.. .they were put in a position where they just sort of had to ...
continue letting us do what it is we thought we should do. So I
think they sort of opened a Pandora's box . . . by not shutting
people up at the very beginning.14 1
At the same time, the parsimonious release of information can have a
lulling effect. Similarly, the provision of some protection to the defendant
facing a tribunal beyond the constitutional pale may produce the illusion
of fairness when in fact, the ultimate conviction is already promised. Did
cases like Quirin and Hamdan contribute to the appearance of justice
when it was in fact absent? Or did these adjudications publicize and
promote the plight of the accused?
B. Transforming the Law, Subverting or Legitimating Injustice
Lawyers may bring a suit in the hope that a legal decision can be
transformative, but the courts are often willing only to impose incremental
changes. Decisions such as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld are useful for
establishing certain important principles. Setting forth the limits of
executive power, as the Court did in Hamdan, was a necessary condition
for adjudication within a constitutional system. The lawyers' work played
a significant role in establishing those principles. Nevertheless, Hamdan
and subsequent decisions left open which, if any, constitutional
protections apply to the detainees who were the subjects of these
petitions.
The federal courts did not live up to the hopes of defense counsel and,
importantly, the defendant in the Hamdan decision.142 Salim Hamdan
himself was detained in Guantinamo until his 2008 trial. That trial
occurred under a slightly improved regime, but one still believed by many
to be procedurally unjust and still outside of the constitutional order. It is
impossible to know whether Hamdan would have been released earlier
from Guantinamo-arguably his ultimate goal-had his lawyers
completed the trial in 2006 rather than delaying with a series of federal
appeals. Things may have been better for Hamdan in 2008. The political
situation in 2008 was different than in 2006, influencing the commission
jurors in Hamdan's trial in his favor. David Hick's light sentence of only
nine months of a seven-year suspended sentence as a result of his 2007
plea deal may have influenced the military commission's sentencing
141. Telephone interview with Lawyer No. 7 (Apr. 6, 2009), at 43.
142. While the opinion represented a win for the defense, in the immediate aftermath of that case
Congress ratified the military commissions with the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 948-50 (2008).
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decision.143 Nevertheless, a "win" that only achieved delay is a very
limited victory from the point of view of the client indefinitely detained in
the Guantinamo Bay prison.
Many of the detainees held in Guantinamo did not put any stock in the
courts. As one lawyer who participated in these cases explained, his
clients "began to see it as a political process. That their only hope was a
change in the administration."'" He came to agree with them:
I think in the end, they were probably right . . .. I overestimated
the judiciary's role and it confirmed a lesson I had learned long
ago-which is, if you really need justice, swift justice, you're not
going to get it in court. It's just not geared up for that. The judges
are too timid, especially in an area like this-where they think
they are intruding on the military, it's terrorism, it's all this
stuff.. . . [A]n unelected, life tenured judge is not going to stand
up and say "Follow me." He's just not going to do it. And it was
unending delay, every time the government filed a motion, it
would take weeks and weeks and months before the court would
hear it. And you want to scream. And my feeling was, initially-
that's why we recommended we followed the laws to begin
with-I thought the courts are the answer. But I learned after bitter
experience, that the courts were not the answer, the political
process was the answer.145
Along similar lines, Jenny Martinez powerfully paraphrased her client
Jose Padilla's question: "Why is it that litigation concerning the alleged
enemy combatants detained at Guantinamo and elsewhere has been going
on for more than six years and almost nothing seems to have actually been
decided?"' 4 6
The lawyers' narrow strategy in litigating Hamdan reveals their trust in
adjudication and their vision of the courts' role in a democracy. In other
words, Hamdan is a testament to the power and the limits of legalism. The
Hamdan case is an important precedent for curbing executive authority,
but with respect to the military commissions it merely gave Congress
another bite at the apple with little guidance as to what constitutes justice
for the accused. The focus on governmental structure-which branch of
143. Sarah Wood, Judge Accepts Australian Detainee's Guilty Plea, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV.,
Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.defenselink.millnews/newsarticle.aspx?id=32642.
144. Interview with Lawyer No. 4, supra note 122, at 31.
145. Id.
146. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1013, 1014-15 (2008) (analyzing the focus on procedures rather than substantive rights in detainee
litigation). But see Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive
Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661 (2009) (arguing that the courts' use of procedure strengthens
important values such as transparency while not dictating the terms of the substantive law to the
coequal branches).
4672012]
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
government had the power to authorize a military commissions system-
overshadowed other critical issues and took off the table important values
that require serious attention, such as how much process is a person
detained in the "War on Terror" entitled to and why? Ultimately, the
question of what process rights protect detainees remains unanswered.
As a practical matter, the appeal appears to have done little for Hamdan
except delay the inevitable, perhaps making his sentence a bit lighter than
it would have been otherwise. One JAG lawyer said about the appellate
strategy in Hamdan:
I thought they wrote their petition in a way that was bad for the
system but was good for their guy-which I suppose is a good
thing. They wanted to win, they wanted the win so they filed the
petition-and their petition essentially invited the court to invite
Congress into the party. And I think that they certainly knew that
if they did win and Congress was invited to the party, that the
system would be much harder to win . . . later down the road ...
But you know [some of us] went around thinking is that just
because they thought it would be cool to win [in] the Supreme
Court? Or does that actually benefit Hamdan? . . . But I can't say
that it was the wrong thing to do to win a case . . . . I probably
would have done the same thing. I would have wanted to win. 147
The strategy in Hamdan illustrates the tension between the thrill of the
appellate strategy for the lawyer and its effectiveness in achieving the
client's goals. This lawyer explained:
I mean, if I'm in federal court ... and I do really, really well-my
client wins, he's very happy-and I get all sorts of accolades from
everybody else and I get more work and I'm a hero. . . . In Gitmo,
everything is on its head. It's completely opposite, where . . . you
could make yourself a hero and it's exactly what your guy doesn't
want and he gains nothing from it.148
Hamdan's lawyers returned to the federal courts one last time to obtain
an answer to the question of what rights protected the accused in military
commissions. In Hamdan v. Gates, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia declined to rule. 49 Instead, that court left the answer
to be determined first by the military commission and ultimately by the
appeals process. This meant that as Hamdan's case went to trial, the
procedural rules for conducting that trial had yet to be firmly established.
The fairness of those rules had not been determined. This was a
fundamental violation of the rule of law principle requiring that the
147. Interview with Lawyer No. 7 (Nov. 2008), at 45.
148. Id. at 46-47.
149. 565 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2008).
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procedural rules be set in advance.
In denying Hamdan's request, the judge evoked a clich6 about justice
that is worth considering in light of the military commissions process. He
wrote: "The eyes of the world are on Guantinamo Bay. Justice must be
done there, and must be seen to be done there, fairly and impartially."'s
One reading of this statement is that the judge equates the importance of
justice being done and justice seen to be done. He could have meant only
that a public trial, rather than a secret one, was critical to procedural
justice. It is important that justice "not be done in a corner nor in any
covert manner."15 ' But the judge also could mean that the appearance of
procedural justice is just as important as the just outcome. What is the
significance of justice being seen to be done if it is not in fact done? This
is the conundrum of publicity in the military commissions context, where
the government's efforts were geared towards the appearance of justice, a
performance of court proceedings without the rights that are traditionally
understood to be the predicate of justice.
Adversarial adjudication is one of the signposts of our collective
conception of procedural justice. Social psychological studies show that
Americans perceive adversarial proceedings as fairer than other types of
processes.15 2 Even if an adversarial hearing is perceived only as a
necessary but not a sufficient condition, it is still a central component of
our collective understanding of how justice is done and often serves as a
stand-in for other components that we all agree are necessary for
procedural justice, such as a neutral decision maker. The use of
adversarial representation as a heuristic for justice increases the
responsibility of lawyers, whose participation in the adversarial
proceeding is part of the presentation of justice being seen to be done.
Habeas petitions such as those that gave rise to Quirin and Hamdan give
lawyers the opportunity to expose the fact that justice is not being done.
But such petitions can justify injustice by creating the false perception
that objections have been fully heard and ruled upon by an independent
and deliberative judiciary. That is the mixed legacy of Quirin and
Hamdan.
Although the spectacle of military tribunals cannot be entirely
controlled by the government, secrecy in the name of national defense
allows the government to exercise a great deal of control over how that
spectacle plays out. Moreover, secret discussions behind the scenes, such
as the threat that the executive will disobey court orders that influenced
150. Id. at 137.
151. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 293 (quoting Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey,
1676).
152. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 79-80 (1997).
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the Supreme Court in Quirin, will also affect the performance of the
courts' role and tempt judges to avert their eyes from injustice.
Here we return to the role that the ideology of legalism plays in
particular with respect to these habeas appeals to the federal courts. On
the one hand, people might attach too much importance to procedures that
will distract them from unjust substantive outcomes.'53 But there is also
the risk that the performance of certain types of procedures (rites) such as
an adversarial adjudication, may serve to signal procedural justice (rights)
when it is in fact absent. Our legalistic culture often relies on legal
frameworks and language, such as due process, to understand justice.'15 4
Both arguments inside and outside the courts are susceptible to the
accusation that they cabin the terms of the discussion and the possibility
of reform. While it is true that the legalistic focus on rule-following and
process can eclipse other values, such as human dignity, the legal arsenal
also offers the possibility of making arguments that enhance these values.
That is especially the case in situations where the courts are asked to
balance the interests of the state with those of individuals, such as the
cases discussed here.
Much has been written, both critical and laudatory, on the concerns of
the federal courts in getting ahead of the populace on social and political
issues.' This is largely because of that classic problem in constitutional
law, the counter-majoritarian difficulty.' 6 The risk for lawyers
participating in this system is that in the process of trying to achieve
incremental change they may instead legitimate injustice. In Hamdan, for
example, the Court encouraged Congress to weigh in and in so doing
reproduced the military commissions in a more unassailable form. Did
this empower members of the populace to call out injustice, or did it lull
them into the belief that the courts, watching over the matter, would set
the right balance? Similarly, in Quirin, did the Court's consideration of
the case, although it declined jurisdiction to hear the merits, in fact create
the impression that the 1942 military commission had been vetted and
was therefore fair? These habeas appeals ran the risk of creating just
enough process to create the empty appearance of justice: an adversarial
argument, an apparently neutral arbiter, and published opinions. On the
153. See Martinez, supra note 146, at 1027.
154. See Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, I ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 323 (2005)
(discussing the concept of legal consciousness and the sociological approaches to the question of why
people obey the law when it fails to live up to its promises).
155. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Reva Siegel & Robert Post, Popular Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004).
156. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998) (describing the conditions for the
development of the concept ofa countermarjoritarian difficulty).
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other hand, the Court's decision to decline jurisdiction or defer to
Congress may be a sufficiently transparent refusal to address the heart of
the matter that it spurs and maybe even strengthens a continued struggle.
Sociologists have argued that individuals, through seemingly small
actions, "'identify the cracks and vulnerabilities of organized power' in
the acts of resistance."' Adjudication is one form of such resistance,
although it is done through established pathways. One risk is that a legal
challenge may sufficiently ameliorate conditions for a brief time to make
insufferable situations tolerable, and, in doing so, "actually inoculate
power from sustained and collective challenge."' 58 The Supreme Court's
decision to permit the tribunal that is beyond the constitutional pale to
continue, as in Quirin, can still inoculate against resistance because it
gives the appearance of reasoned deliberation and review by an
independent branch of government. To the extent that the courts lend
legitimacy to a process by hearing arguments even as they are already
prepared to reject them, then the lawyers assist in legitimating the court's
decision by making their arguments within the constraints of adjudication.
Consider, in this light, the decision of the Dasch's lawyer, Colonel
Ristine, not to appeal to the federal courts. Ristine's decision did no more
for his client or for the principles of legality than did the decision of
Royall to appeal. In the end, Ristine's client, Dasch, received the lightest
sentence of all.' 59 At the same time, the decision not to appeal prevents
the court from entertaining more far reaching arguments.
Finally, a successful suit, even on narrow grounds, can have
repercussions far beyond the law being made. Success in the Supreme
Court can change the tide of public opinion and may spur more lawyers to
become involved in resisting injustice. For example, a lawyer who
participated in an appeal on behalf of detainees held in Guantinamo as
early as 2002 explained the significance of the Supreme Court victory in
that case: "When we won in the Supreme Court in 2004, then all of a
sudden, the floodgates opened and everybody-Johnny-come-lately-
came aboard .... all of a sudden, these firms were interested, they wanted
to sign up; it became sexy . . . ."i60 Even when adjudication does not
achieve the lawyers' goals directly, it can be part of a larger democratic
dialogue.
157. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 6, at 187 (quoting Joel F. Handler, A Reply, 26 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 819-24 (1992)).
158. Id.
159. Dasch was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. John Peter Burger was sentenced to life.
The rest of the saboteurs were executed. Danelski, supra note 7, at 72.
160. Interview with Lawyer No. 4, supra note 121, at 14.
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CONCLUSION
In the two stories told here-of the 1942 military commission created to
try Nazi saboteurs and of the 2001 military commission created to try
Guantinamo detainees-defense lawyers believed that through reasoned
argument to the federal courts, governmental decisions to place certain
trials outside the constitutional order could be reversed. These lawyers,
separated by sixty years, expressed through their actions faith in the
capacity of the federal courts to be deliberative, sophisticated and
independent. Their decisions and tactics framed the courts' responses to
military commissions. Their stories illuminate the continuing hold that
adjudication has on the legal imagination, even as the ultimate results in
the two narratives demonstrate the limits of the courts' ability (or
willingness) to defend unpopular individual rights in wartime. They also
raise a host of ethical questions that will continue to be debated. If it is
politically impossible to have a trial with constitutional protections for a
set of defendants, what then? What does more damage to democracy, the
existence of persons held beyond the rule of law or the pretense of
legality?16 1 These are serious questions for a democracy in crisis, and as
Resnik points out, "if American law is to cherish human dignity, it will be
because more than life-tenured judges make it do so."' 6 2
161. The Supreme Court struggled with this question in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004),
ultimately holding that something less than a full trial with the attendant constitutional protections is
acceptable for American citizens held as enemy combatants.
162. Resnik, supra note 87, at 685.
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